A Resounding Failure
A growing body of research shows that regime change rarely achieves its desired goals. It almost never improves a country’s economic conditions, creates stable democracy or promotes more secure relations that advance U.S. interests. It does, however, increase risks of civil war, degrade respect for human rights and force the United States into lengthy nation-building projects it had hoped to avoid. It also undermines a fundamental principle of international law, the presumption of sovereignty, and makes what happens within a nation-state the business of foreigners.
Scholars have argued about whether the cause of regime change is economic development or institutional evolution, sometimes pitting these as rival modes of explanation (though both may be partially responsible). But there are signs that both are important. The pace of economic growth is influenced by the structure of the economy and by the types of institutions in place, and a country’s institutions evolve to suit its economic environment. But these micro-processes may not be enough to trigger transitions: a revolution or invasion is likely to succeed only when incumbents make mistakes that expose their weakness, or when circumstances ripen for them to do so.
Yet a long history of overthrowing foreign governments, from the American debacle in Vietnam to the failed coup in Venezuela and military interventions in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that forcible regime change is a risky strategy. It often fails to accomplish its desired goal and can leave a country in disarray, with a weak government and fractious factions vying for power.
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